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Abstract
One of the standard objections against guilds in the premodern world has been
their exclusiveness. Guilds have been portrayed as providing unfair advantages to
the children of established masters and locals, over immigrants and other out-
siders. Privileged access to certain professions and industries is seen as a source of
inequality and a disincentive for technological progress. In this paper, we examine
this assumption by studying the composition of guild masters and apprentices
from a large sample of European towns and cities from 1600 to 1800, focusing
on the share who were children of masters or locals. These data offer an indirect
measurement of the strength of guild barriers and, by implication, of their monop-
olies. We find very wide variation between guilds in practice, but most guild mas-
ters and apprentices were immigrants or unrelated locals: openness was much
more common than closure, especially in larger centers. Our understanding of
guild “monopolies” and exclusivity is in need of serious revision.
It is generally assumed that restricted access to urban manufacturing and trade
constrained the premodern economy. Restricted access was part of a wider set of
regulations that imposed political constraints on economic development
(“feudalism”). Urban citizenship regimes generally limited some, or even all,
economic roles to male full citizens, or burgesses, freemen, bourgeois, burgers,
Bu¨rger, and so on. Within most cities, access to specific economic roles was fur-
ther constrained by guilds. Guilds were approved and supported by local govern-
ments. In some cities, moreover, guilds dominated the local government,
creating an obvious potential for self-interested rent-seeking. This combination
of urban citizenship and guilds—both restricted almost always to men—has
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9
been portrayed by many economic historians as a great villain in restricting ac-
cess to markets and thus harming consumers and hampering progress.1 The
guilds’ abolition, and the emergence of national citizenship in the nineteenth
century, is, in turn, one of the conventional explanations for industrialization
and modern economic growth.2
A standard element of the guild system was that the members were granted,
as a privilege of their membership, the exclusive right to produce and sell a spe-
cific product or range of products. This privilege is usually called the guild
“monopoly.” While monopoly is commonly understood in terms of the output
market, the successful exercise of market power also requires restrictions on the
entrance of new producers. As Gary Richardson has pointed out, what historians
of guilds have in mind when they discuss issues of monopoly is something akin
to Adam Smith’s definition in The Wealth of Nations (1776): “laws which re-
strain, in particular employments, the competition to a smaller number than
might otherwise go into them.”3 Questions have been raised, however, about
the effectiveness of the monopoly: could guilds really monitor and enforce, espe-
cially in large urban centers, their “monopoly”? Or were they undercut by inter-
lopers and illicit producers, on the one hand, and by supplies of goods from
other localities, some without guilds, on the other?4
The objective of monopoly is to drive up prices above the level achieved by
open competition, to the advantage of the monopolist. In the case of early-
modern European guilds, it is difficult to demonstrate whether this was happen-
ing. Therefore, many historians have instead looked at the supply side. As
Smith’s definition implies, if guilds managed to limit their membership, in terms
of numbers, of geographical backgrounds, and of descent, this would more or
less automatically have implied rents, for all members, for locals, or for the mas-
ters’ offspring. The extent to which guilds were “open” or “closed,” therefore,
had implications not only for the size of rents that accrued to guild members but
also for how these opportunities were distributed. As Sheilagh Ogilvie states the
position: “To establish their monopolies and monopsonies, guilds excluded
entrants.”5 In earlier work, she found strong evidence that “guilds seek to restrict
entry so as to limit competition.”6 Guild membership, it has also been claimed,
was dominated by sons of established masters or by people who had been born
locally. Individuals without a family relationship to the membership, and espe-
cially immigrants, found it much more difficult to access incorporated trades.7
In this article, we evaluate the strength of guild “monopolies” by exploring
the composition of guild membership in a large sample of towns from across
western Europe. Our data covers over a hundred thousand masters from twenty-
seven towns, and 450,000 apprentices from twenty-one towns, ranging from
Bristol to Vienna and from Gdansk (Danzig) to Madrid. We focus on craft and
service guilds rather than merchant guilds because of the somewhat distinct in-
stitutional histories of the latter. Our focus is on how often those we might term
“outsiders” based on kinship or origin became guild members. This, we argue,
offers one way to evaluate the significance of the economic constraints that
guilds created. The array of formal rules established by guilds to define and con-
trol who could gain entry have been used by historians to highlight the scale of
barriers faced by people without a previous connection to the urban trades. By
implication, they have also been taken as indicating the rewards membership
brought to insiders.8 Logically, if guilds did indeed generate valuable economic
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9
rents to insiders, their preservation depended on the guilds preventing an influx
of new members that would dissipate these rents. Moreover, we would expect
those who were already within the guild to try to limit entrants to a small pool
of kin, friends, and neighbors: to keep rents within the family, in the same way
as they would property.
Assuming that successful monopolists will seek to favor their own sons
when selecting the next generation of beneficiaries, we use evidence on the pro-
portion of outsiders in guild admissions and memberships as an indicator of the
effectiveness of barriers to entry. There are, obviously, more dimensions to the
“monopoly” issue than access. Some German crafts, such as those in Frankfurt
and Augsburg, for example, had annual quotas on the number of new masters,
and the same happened in Paris.9 Still, if access to the “monopoly” was open to
large numbers of “outsiders,” then it would seem that guilds were less exclusive
than is often implied, at least for men (keeping in mind that even guilds open
to outsiders generally excluded the female half of the population). The net effect
of their presence on the skilled male labor market may not have been as oner-
ous, let alone as disastrous, as many historians claim.10 We therefore want to
find an answer to this straightforward question: to what extent were guilds in
premodern Europe closed to outsiders?
Any answer to this question will need to account for variation along several
dimensions. Guilds were too numerous and varied in nature and existed in too
wide an array of political and economic contexts to possess a single unitary char-
acter. We therefore focus on how guilds differed across Europe. Four theses have
been proposed by historians to explain variations in guild openness. The first
highlights regional variation. A broad consensus that English guilds dwindled in
the eighteenth century11 has expanded to the claim that while guilds in
England and the Dutch Republic became more open, those of the German lands
and possibly other regions remained exclusive.12
A second thesis concerns guilds’ political influence: where guilds had a
stake in local governance, they were able to erect barriers for newcomers.13 A
powerful example of this relationship comes from sixteenth-century Ghent.
Before 1540, and again between 1579 and 1584, the guilds of Ghent had a
strong voice in local government. Between 1541 and 1578, and again after
1584, the Habsburg government excluded guilds from local government and
forced guilds to become more accessible to outsiders. The Ghent evidence sug-
gests that, when guilds were able to fully control access, they might exclude out-
siders from their ranks.14 An equally compelling example from the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries was uncovered by Ogilvie’s investigation of the
Wildberg weaving district in Wu¨rttemberg.15
A third thesis, which can be seen as a variation on the first, can be inferred
from the literature on state formation. As states became more powerful, we
might expect them to have exerted greater control over guilds and, if they val-
ued guilds’ activities, to have supported their attempts to remain exclusive.
Following this logic, guilds in the eighteenth century might have been generally
more closed to outsiders than they had been in the seventeenth century.16
Alternatively, some have argued that states were promoting greater equality
and, therefore, attempting to reduce the impact of “special interests” like
guilds.17 For example, Clare Crowston has shown that the French state’s efforts
to increase economic production and employment under Louis XIV led to the
Monopoly and Mobility in European Craft Guilds 3
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9
creation of all-female and mixed-sex guilds in a small number of trades, thus in-
creasing access for women, the ultimate guild outsiders.18
The fourth thesis looks at the size of communities. In his famous German
Home Towns, from 1971, Mack Walker connected the German guilds’ strict ad-
mission rules to the tightness of the face-to-face communities in which they op-
erated. His “home towns” were typically communities of fewer than ten
thousand inhabitants.19 From a demographic perspective, Maurice Garden has
made the same point: large and growing towns were in greater need of immi-
grants to sustain their population.20 If this is correct, we should expect more
openness in larger towns.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we discuss the methodological
challenges involved in measuring openness in labor markets and describe our
measures of family and geographical connectedness. In the second section, we
present evidence on the openness of guilds to new masters without a connection
by kinship. In the third section, we evaluate guilds’ willingness to accept
migrants as masters. In the fourth section, we look at how important kinship
and local origins were to obtaining a place as an apprentice. The fifth section
evaluates how well our data fit with the four main theses on guild openness. We
then consider whether or not our findings indicate a change from an earlier era
of guild practice in the sixteenth century or before and whether a more direct
comparison of guild openness and urban immigration rates produces different
conclusions. We conclude that on all of our measures, most of Europe’s guilds
were more open to outsiders than blanket assertions about their exclusive behav-
ior imply; guild “monopolies” were often only weakly supported by a narrowly
bounded membership.
Methodology
In order to evaluate the openness of guilds and the validity of these four
theses, we need a valid measure of closure. In this article, “outsiders” are defined
in two distinct ways: those who were not the direct descendants of guild mem-
bers and those originating from outside the town where the guild was based.
These definitions have the merit of being categories used by meaningful actors
in the early modern period, widely included in existing secondary studies, and
conceptually relevant. Immediate kinship was prioritized—and rewarded—in
many guilds, while defining local origin narrowly gives us the greatest likelihood
that candidates for membership were known to existing members and so might
hope to receive preferential treatment. A richer definition of kinship that takes
into account ties created through the female line or more distant relationships,
would obviously be preferable, but too little evidence of this kind has been un-
covered to make this a feasible approach for a comparative study. And of course,
these are not the only meaningful categories; other boundaries—such as gender,
nationality, or religion—mattered too.21
Recent scholarship on the history of Europe’s guilds has produced a body of
information about these aspects of their membership that is, almost by defini-
tion, local. Our objective is to compare these data, which imposes some limita-
tions on our approach. First, the availability of data means that we concentrate
on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Material for the sixteenth century
or earlier is included and discussed but is too thin to allow firm comparative
4 Winter 2020Journal of Social History
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conclusions. Second, much of our data relates to England and the Low
Countries, where some of the most active guild research has been concentrated.
We have endeavored to include just enough evidence for France, Germany and
Central Europe, and for Italy and Spain to claim that the picture presented here
can provide insights into Europe as a whole, rather than for a small—and possi-
bly atypical—part of it. To overcome the dominance of the number of observa-
tions from London or Paris, we have ignored the size of towns and used
unweighted observations in our analyses. The results from tiny Wildberg there-
fore count for as much as those from enormous London because we assume that
Wildberg is potentially representative of a whole class of small European towns.
Another methodological challenge for establishing the impact of restric-
tions on entering the economic arena is establishing a benchmark for openness.
Critics of the guilds often seem to implicitly posit a completely open labor mar-
ket. Labor economists, however, question whether this scenario ever exists out-
side the textbook, with current thinking emphasizing the importance of frictions
in the labor market that generate rents to almost all jobs.22 Formal and informal
barriers create “segments” that privilege some groups of workers over others.
Segmented labor markets have also been identified in the pre-industrial pe-
riod.23 The implication is that in the absence of guilds there would likely have
been other obstacles producing similar effects. For example, we can assume the
presence of a strong gendered division of labor, regardless of the existence of
guilds.
Clear evidence of segmentation in historical labor markets without guilds
can be found in the period after the decline of the guilds. Some occupations dis-
played strong intergenerational continuities, even without institutional barriers
to entry of the kind that guilds provided. In industrial Lancashire, over 60 per-
cent of textile workers had followed their fathers into the trade, while in
nineteenth-century London and Barcelona, around half of those entering arti-
sanal trades were following in their fathers’ footsteps.24 In Canada today, around
40 percent of young men work for the same employer for which their father also
worked, and 6–9 percent have the same employer in adulthood.25 This percent-
age is likely to be higher among the self-employed, who frequently turn over
businesses to the next generation.26 In other words, the segmentation of the la-
bor market that is produced by factors other than guilds in industrial societies
raises questions about how we can empirically identify the distinctive role of
guilds in the promotion or inhibition of flexible labor markets in pre-industrial
societies.
In this article, we do not solve this problem but propose that to some extent
it can be circumvented by assuming that large numbers of entrants previously
unrelated to the trade constitute a situation of “openness,” while small numbers
of “new” entrants point in the direction of high barriers to entry. This approach
is, at the least, a fair test of the claims made in the current literature about open-
ness. Our main aim is to map patterns of relative openness that may allow us to
assess the causes and height of barriers to entry and their likely significance. In
order to offer some insight into absolute levels of openness, we also compare our
results for the percentage of local immigrants among guild members with compa-
rable percentages for urban populations as a whole. This approach offers a stron-
ger test of geographical openness, but it is only possible for a few locations
because of the lack of historical data on migration.
Monopoly and Mobility in European Craft Guilds 5
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Our data capture access to guilds at two different points. First, we look di-
rectly at new entrants through the study of membership registers. Second, we
gauge the characteristics of the membership through apprenticeship. Craft guilds
usually required their members to spend several years learning their craft.27 Not
all apprentices would become masters, but this was a stage that gave individuals
the potential to become a master and, therefore, one which helps to flesh out
our grasp of guild openness.
The measures that we use to evaluate openness vary because the nature of
guild barriers and guild records varied in cities across Europe. In places where
citizenship was a prerequisite for joining a guild, access to urban economic activ-
ities might be limited by citizenship barriers.28 Elsewhere, membership in a guild
was the first hurdle that newcomers had to overcome before becoming a citizen.
In those towns, citizenship was, in other words, a secondary effect of guild mem-
bership.29 These various institutional structures affect the sources that were cre-
ated. Sometimes guilds kept registers of the place of origin of their members and
apprentices or whether their parents were a member of the guild. Others charged
different entrance fees for sons of masters or locals and listed them in their
accounts. Rarely do we have both place of origin and family descent for the
same guild. For more detail, we refer readers to the data appendix.
By aggregating across towns and regions, we necessarily treat guilds as if
they were internally homogeneous, but this was not so. The members of the
Painters Guild in Haarlem, for example, had a debate during the 1630s and
1640s about the desirability of public auctions, raffles, and lotteries, which,
according to the guild officials, were “extremely damaging to, and disrespectful
of, the artist and the art of painting.” Yet guild members were themselves
heavily involved in these illicit practices, and one of the offenders was a former
dean, Frans de Grebber, who argued that these outlets stimulated the demand
for paintings and could especially benefit young little-known masters.30 Access
might likewise be a source of internal contestation. The Haarlem Tailors com-
plained in 1707 that their trade was in trouble due to “the great number of
seamstresses”—seamstresses who were also members of the guild. In Zutphen, in
the eastern part of the Dutch Republic, male guild members introduced a rule
that the number of seamstresses should be limited to five.31 The data presented
in this article were the result of such internal struggles.
One final, critical point needs to be underlined about our approach. Our
definition of “insiders” and “outsiders” takes for granted that the great majority
of guilds were restricted to men. The exclusion of women was a virtually univer-
sal aspect of guild practices across Europe and thus is not a meaningful measure
of relative openness at this scale. This was at least partly the effect of deliberate
gender bars. Especially in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as a result of
both the reinforcement of changes in the labor market and patriarchy during
the Reformation, some guilds included explicit clauses to this effect in their reg-
ulations.32 In many more places, the exclusion of women was simply the result
of a shared bias among the membership and wider society. This is not to say that
variation in women’s access to guilds—as widows, daughters, and second-class or
independent members—was not substantial. Europe was even home to a few
mixed-sex and all-female guilds, in which masters’ and mistresses’ daughters
enjoyed the same privileges as sons.33 Further research is necessary to illuminate
patterns of female access and their implications for gender norms, the
6 Winter 2020Journal of Social History
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composition of the labor market, family structures, and other issues. The overall
contribution of guild policies—explicit or implicit—is difficult to measure be-
cause the distribution across the workforce would not have been equal even if
there had been no obstacles and because guild policies were embedded in
broader social patterns.34
Family Membership in Guilds
During the second half of the eighteenth century, the membership of the
Butchers’ Guild of ’s-Hertogenbosch consisted entirely of people whose fathers,
or fathers-in-law, had been or still were members of the same guild. Remarkably,
new members were admitted as toddlers—that is, before they could possibly
have completed an apprenticeship or otherwise demonstrated their skills. The
reason behind this unusual state of affairs was the fixed number of places, in the
forms of stalls, in the town’s meat hall, and the private ownership of those
stalls.35 This allowed the guild to impose cartel conditions on the meat supply.
However, precisely because the licensed butchers were in this position, the local
authorities opened up the market to external suppliers in 1770, after the com-
mander of the local garrison had complained that his soldiers were over-charged
for their meat. Several new butchers then settled in ’s-Hertogenbosch, among
them eight Jews, and started to sell meat outside the meat hall. In 1773, the
guild filed a bitter complaint, claiming that these outsiders were able to charge
lower prices because they sold poor-quality product. The guild’s privileges were
restored—on the condition that its members would restrain prices.36
The state of affairs in the ’s-Hertogenbosch Butchers’ Guild conforms with
one popular image of the guilds: membership was routinely transferred from fa-
ther to son. Inheritable membership was the most exclusive mechanism that
privileged established masters and their immediate offspring over outsiders,
however defined. Many guilds actively shaped their rules to favor the children
of members: for non-sons it was between 1.3 and 2.7 times more expensive to
join the Antwerp Coopers’ Guild, depending on the fluctuating tariffs.37
Among Dutch Tailors’ Guilds, the gap tended to be on the lower end of the
Antwerp spectrum, but almost all of them favored family members (and to a
lesser extent locals) by charging them lower entrance fees.38 The question is to
what extent such preferential treatment for people with family ties to the guild
actually shaped the composition of the membership. Or to phrase this in a dif-
ferent way: were the Butchers of ’s-Hertogenbosch typical among guilds of the
period?
Two striking pieces of evidence that support the thesis that guilds offered
preferential treatment to close relatives come from Northern and Central
Europe. The first are the Butchers we already discussed, who happened to live
in the Dutch Republic, a region that is often portrayed as “liberal” with “weak”
guilds. An almost equally extreme example is found in the town of Wildberg in
southern Germany, where over 90 percent of the weavers were following in
their fathers’ footsteps. Wildberg, located in the Swabian Black Forest, had a
population of 1,500–2,000. Its economy was dominated by the textiles sector,
which was embedded in a larger regional proto-industry, dominated by a mer-
chant guild that controlled both production and exports.39 Together with
Monopoly and Mobility in European Craft Guilds 7
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Durlach and Hildesheim, Wildberg is one of the three smallest towns in our
dataset.
Elsewhere, however, the shares of new masters who were sons or daughters
of guild members were much more modest (figures 1a and 1b). The cities and
towns with the next highest shares of new masters with kinship ties were Rouen
(57 percent), ’s-Hertogenbosch (40 percent), and Hildesheim (35 percent). In
most places, shares were well below this level.
In England, masters’ children only rarely supplied more than 20 percent of
new masters. For cities in both France and the Low Countries, we found an
unweighted average of 26 and 27 percent in each area. Our evidence for both
Spain and the Italian peninsula is thinner—with the latter only represented in
our sample by the Turin Tailors’ Guild—but in both the share of masters’ chil-
dren among new masters was also mostly low, although the Valencian silk guild
had a kin share of 66 percent in the second half of the eighteenth century.
Germany is the only country in which the average is above a third, with 44 per-
cent of new masters across the guilds in our sample possessing a kinship tie. This
figure is pulled up by Wildberg’s particularly high rates of insider recruitment,
but, as figure 1a shows, Germany did have a number of other guilds that drew
heavily from members’ kin. Even excluding Wildberg, the average kin share is
36 percent across the other eight German guilds in our sample.
Although the spread of guilds, cities, and countries in our sample does
change over time, figure 1b shows that the kinship averages in the four half-
century periods we discuss fell within a narrow range, between 21 and 30 per-
cent.40 In short, despite changes in the composition of our sample—notably the
inclusion of more observations from Germany in the eighteenth century—the
majority of guilds continued to be dominated by entrants from outside their
existing members’ immediate families. These figures only relate to the children
of guild members. That is the category that the guilds focused on, suggesting
that it had the greatest relevance for contemporaries. A wider definition of kin-
ship would surely expand the share of relations entering guilds. However, data
from London about family connections other than direct descent suggests that
these push up the share of new members who had a family connection with the
guild by relatively small amounts.41
Masters’ children following their father into the same guild offer the most
obvious indication of insider preference and guild openness, particularly in a pa-
triarchal society such as early modern Europe. However, another kind of family
connection also existed that offered a channel into a guild. In some cities and
guilds, a man who married a master’s daughter or widow would gain admittance
to a guild by virtue of their wife’s position. Data from eighteenth-century
Hildesheim suggest that sons-in-law and widows’ second husbands could amount
to a substantial number of new masters. In the four Hildesheim guilds for which
evidence exists, sons-in-law made up 29 percent of new masters, and another 32
percent had married the daughter or widow of a master.42 Taken together with
the 35 percent of masters who were sons, this level of entry by marriage meant
that entrants with a direct or affinal kin tie to existing masters surely constituted
the majority of new guild members in this community; masters’ daughters could
form a large share of the next generation of masters’ wives.
It is not clear that we should generalize from Hildesheim, however.
Marriage to a master’s daughter or widow did not always bring guild privileges:
8 Winter 2020Journal of Social History
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Figure 1. Share of kin among new masters in European guilds
1a: Kinship rates by country
1b: Kinship rates by period
Note: figure 1a reports the unweighted mean share of new masters who have a recorded
kin tie to an existing guild member for each guild across all periods in our sample; each
guild is thus represented by a single observation. Figure 1b reports the mean share for
individual guilds in each period. Both figures show each guild as a single point, with the
mean value for the country/period indicated by an X with the percentage share above.
Vertical grid lines are inserted at 33 percent and 66 percent to provide an aid to
comparison. Source: see appendix 1.
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this right existed in many centers in the German lands and France but was rare
in England and the Southern and Northern Netherlands. Even where it did ex-
ist, if we assume that the number of masters’ daughters roughly equaled the num-
ber of masters’ sons and that all marriages were motivated by entering the
father’s guild, then the evidence in figure 1 suggests that the total share of new
masters with a kinship tie would still only be around half of new entrants in
most cities and guilds that we observe. These cases highlight the ambiguity of
“outsider” and “insider” distinctions. They also point to the ways that women
contributed informally to the formation of guilds, even where they were formally
excluded.
Finally, we need to ask if masters who entered guilds via inheritance formed
a privileged cohort. Perhaps this group had an importance and access to author-
ity that exceeded their numerical share. On the one hand, there are reasons to
expect that sons of masters were more likely to complete their apprenticeship.43
On the other, an investigation of the board members of eighteenth-century tai-
lors’ guilds in the Dutch Republic does not give any indication that sons of mas-
ters were more likely to be elected than others. In Amsterdam, many deans were
first-generation immigrants. Although positions of authority provided social sta-
tus, guilds in the small town of Elburg had to introduce a rule that nobody could
refuse to accept the position of dean, if elected by the membership, suggesting it
was as much a burden as an honor to be selected for such an influential post.44
The evidence indicates that only in exceptional circumstances were guilds
dominated by dynasties of masters who passed on their businesses from one gen-
eration to the next. The normal situation was that a minority, sometimes quite
a small minority, of masters had entered the guild as the direct successor of their
father (or mother). Endogamy among guild members was unusual.45 Financial
and other barriers were no doubt designed to advantage the relatives of estab-
lished masters, but, generally, they did not prevent high levels of non-kin
membership.
Migrants in Guilds
In January 1757, the journeyman stonemason Franz Strickner filed a peti-
tion with the council of Vienna, asking to be confirmed in his mastership.
Strickner, who originated from the small border town of Eggenburg to the
northwest of Vienna, had taken over the workshop of the Viennese master
Matthias Winkler, on the condition that he would look after Winkler’s widow
and marry his granddaughter. All looked set for a successful career, but the guild
refused to examine his masterpiece and, therefore, prevented his admission to
the guild. According to the guild’s counterpetition, the granddaughter was long
dead, and the widow was rich enough to take care of herself. Instead of the out-
sider Strickner, the guild had a strong preference for the “citizen and master’s
son” Carl Schunko, whose father had already tried to persuade Winkler’s widow
to allow Carl to take over the workshop.46
The records do not tell us who was ultimately victorious in this conflict
about mastership, but the story highlights how contentious access to the guilds
could become. It also illustrates a common suspicion about guilds: that they had
an innate tendency to prevent people from other places from joining their ranks,
preferring to draw their membership from among the locals. Although the guild
10 Winter 2020Journal of Social History
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pointed to the widow’s wealth and the granddaughter’s death as justification, it
is hard to avoid the conclusion that it perceived female kin-rights as less legiti-
mate than those of men. We have no way of knowing the strength of guild offi-
cials’ preferences, but we can identify the results of any actions they took by
again looking at the distribution of insiders and outsiders, this time comparing
the shares of locals and migrants among new masters. We report the share of
new masters who were locals, by period, in figure 2.
The range of values for the share of locals among new masters is much wider
than on the kinship measure. Many more guilds are positioned in the middle of
the range, and far fewer are hovering close to zero than in figure 1. Of course,
guilds that recruited only a handful of locals might be thought of as excessively
open, implying either a particularly unappealing occupation or possibly their
capture by a specific group of migrants. In general, the great majority of guilds
(85 percent) drew less than two-thirds of their membership from the local popu-
lation, and in well over half (61 percent), locals represented less than 50 percent
of new masters.
Most of our evidence on the geographical origins of masters comes from
England, especially London, and from German Europe. When guilds are pre-
sented by country, as in figure 2a, we observe a pattern that is the opposite of
what much of the literature might lead one to expect, with guilds in the Low
Countries recruiting a high share of masters from locals (58 percent), followed
by English guilds (45 percent), and finally German guilds (38 percent); our two
city observations from Spain (Madrid at 28 percent and Valencia at 93 percent)
are so far apart that they defy placement on this spectrum.47 There is no sign on
this measure that German guilds were systematically more closed than those in
England or the Netherlands, although the sample size for the latter is modest.
This is a striking contrast to what we saw in our earlier discussion of the share of
new masters with kin ties, where German guilds looked more closed than those
elsewhere. Behind this contrast is the substantial increase in the size of our
German guild sample: we have information about the share of locals among new
masters for thirty-three German guilds, compared to the nine discussed earlier. It
seems likely that this migration-based measure thus better reflects the breadth of
guild practices across Germany. At the very least, we can be sure that a great
deal of heterogeneity existed within countries and regions, particularly in the ex-
tensive German lands, as well as between guilds within the same city.
Figure 2b reports the share of locals by half century. Shifting composition
aside, it suggests that guilds may have been drifting toward recruiting more new
masters locally as time passed. The trend is not very strong, however.48 When
we look at patterns of recruitment within guilds over time, we see further indica-
tions of this: in London, where we have the strongest sequential series of evi-
dence, the share of new masters who came from the city more than doubled
from 28 to 59 percent between the first half of the seventeenth century and the
second half of the eighteenth century. Gloucester, similarly, saw the share of
locals almost double from 44 to 78 percent between 1600–49 and 1700–49.
This trend was not universal, though. Over the same two hundred years, in
Madrid the share of locals remained essentially stable, at around 30 percent,
while in Bristol the share only rose gently from 42 to 49 percent from 1650–99
to 1750–99.
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Figure 2. Share of locals among new masters in European guilds
2a: Local shares by country
2b: Local shares by period
Note: figure 2a reports the unweighted mean share of new masters who were local to a
town or city for each guild across all periods in our sample; each guild is thus
represented by a single observation. figure 2b reports the mean for individual guilds by
period. Both figures show each guild as a single point, with the mean value for each
country/period indicated by an X with the percentage share above. Vertical grid lines
are inserted at 33 percent and 66 percent to provide an aid to comparison. Source: see
appendix 1.
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In general, most guilds included a substantial share of migrants among their
membership. Few European guilds were completely dominated by locals. On this
measure, although insiders were more numerous than kin, most guilds still had a
majority of outsiders in their membership.
Access to Apprenticeship
Thomas Gent was born in Ireland, probably in 1693. He started an appren-
ticeship as a printer in Dublin but ran away to England in 1710. The published
version of his autobiography starts with a seasick Gent on the ship that took
him across the Irish Sea. Finding no printing press in Chester, his first port of
call, he traveled on to London, where he continued to learn his trade. In 1713,
Gent completed the seven years of training that were required of every master
artisan under English law. At the end of his time, his master Midwinter offered
Gent hospitality and protection: “I do not prefer my interest to your good; and
though you came [as] an almost stranger to me, God forbid that I should send
you as such abroad.” He helped secure Gent some odd jobs and finally a place as
a journeyman-printer in York. Subsequently, Gent returned to London and his
former master and, in 1717, entered the Stationers’ Company, the guild of
London booksellers.49
Once again, the question is: was Gent’s experience of finding an apprentice-
ship in a distant city typical? The volume of available evidence for apprentices
is smaller than for masters, as record survival is more limited. Moreover, in
many places outside of England, masters’ sons did not need to be formally regis-
tered as apprentices if they were being trained at home. In those guilds, appren-
tices were by definition outsiders on one of our measures (where we can observe
masters’ children, the effect on the statistics is limited; the great majority of
locals were still not the close relatives of guild members). Nonetheless, we pos-
sess sufficient evidence from a range of guilds to illustrate some general patterns.
In figure 3, we report the average shares of locals and kin among apprentices
by country and half century. The figure points to a marked contrast between our
two measures of openness that echoes the differences seen in the sample of mas-
ters. On the one hand, guilds were highly varied in the share of locals that they
recruited as apprentices. On the other, the share of masters’ close kin found
among apprentices was relatively similar—and much lower.
The sample size beneath the country averages is not large, as figure 3a
shows, but even so there is at least some suggestion that guilds in the Low
Countries were often less open by this measure than those in other parts of
Europe, while guilds in England, France, and Spain look more similar to each
other.50 If we look instead at city-level averages, we gain a greater sense of the
scale and factors that lay behind these differences. Our sample includes guilds
from sixteen cities. In eleven of these, less than half of apprentices were locals:
Liverpool, booming in the early eighteenth century, had the lowest share with
just 12 percent, followed by the expanding Spanish capital, Madrid (27 per-
cent), France’s manufacturing powerhouse Lyon (28 percent), and—somewhat
unexpectedly—the provincial English town of Lincoln (35 percent). Most of
the cities where local youths dominated apprenticeships were experiencing peri-
ods of economic decline in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries: Antwerp
(81 percent), Leiden (70 percent), and Amsterdam (67 percent). Only Paris (72
Monopoly and Mobility in European Craft Guilds 13
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percent) and Bristol (53 percent) combined growth and high shares of locals
among apprentices. Kin shares suggest a similar conclusion, with sons and
daughters particularly rare in thriving London (4 percent) and exploding
Liverpool (2 percent) compared to the small town of Boston (36 percent).
Compared to the shares of locals among new masters, there is much less of a
sense of increasing closure in the apprentice data. Across the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the overall average of locals among apprentices in the
guilds in our sample was broadly stable, though with significant variations, with
an average of just below half of apprentices coming from within the town or city
where they trained. And, as the distribution in 3c suggests, there was consis-
tently a wide range among guilds.
Access to apprenticeship was relatively open to outsiders in most European
guilds. It is instructive to compare the overall share of locals among apprentices
with that among new masters, even though the samples cover slightly different
cities and guilds. The share of locals was similar in both: the average share of
locals among new masters was 44 percent, just one percentage point from the 45
percent share of locals among apprentices. Highly closed guilds were uncommon
on both measures: just a fifth of guilds recruited less than a third of their new
apprentices or masters from outside their locality. In fact, 65 percent of guilds in
our sample recruited over half of their apprentices from elsewhere, and
Figure 3. Share of locals and kin among apprentices in European guilds
Note: figures 3a and 3b report the unweighted mean share of apprentices who were kin to
a master or local to a town or city for each guild across all periods in our sample. figures 3c
and 3d report the mean for individual guilds by period; each guild can appear once in any
period. Both figures show each guild as a single point, with the mean value for each region/
period indicated by an X with the percentage share above. Vertical grid lines are inserted at
33 percent and 66 percent to provide an aid to comparison. Source: see appendix 1.
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62 percent drew over half of their new masters from other places. Europe’s guilds
tended to be as “open” to apprentices from outside as they were to new masters.
Explanations for Guild Openness
To what extent does the pattern of guild openness that we observe here
support the four theses that exist to explain when and why guilds raised barriers
to entry: divergent regional traditions; the power of guilds over local govern-
ment; the size of the community; and change over time?
First, we have to reject the view that guilds in England and the Dutch
Republic were somehow more open because of regional specifics in political
economy and institutions. As figures 1–3 have consistently shown, we can ob-
serve guilds in Spain and Italy that are as open as any in the Netherlands or
England. London’s guilds very much resemble those in Berlin and Vienna; only
Paris looks more closed. Wildberg was, it seems, quite different from many of
the other towns and cities we can observe for the German world, which were of-
ten closer in character to those found elsewhere in Europe. Remarkably, it is the
Low Countries that turn out to have had the most consistent tendency to recruit
masters and apprentices locally, whereas France, Italy, and Spain together had
the most open guilds on this measure. Few of these differences, however, were
statistically meaningful, in part because of the wide variations between guilds
within regions and cities. Statistical tests of the equality of the mean share of
locals among masters between England and the three comparison regions of
Germany, the Low Countries, and Latin Europe (the combination of France,
Italy, and Spain) fail to reject the hypothesis that the share of locals was equal
at the 5 percent level of significance.51 Only for kin shares, where the excep-
tional nature of Wildberg plays an important role, do we find a significant differ-
ence between Germany and England. If we calculate the country-level averages
for openness to migrant apprentices, the Low Countries again have the highest
share of locals (63 percent). Conversely, there is little to distinguish France (43
percent), England (39 percent), and Spain (35 percent).52
The argument that the local political “regime” might have affected the abil-
ity of guilds to close their ranks is in one way difficult to evaluate: only a minor-
ity of the towns in our dataset actually had governments in which guilds held
much power.53 Most guilds were politically weak, in formal terms at least. If we
compare levels of openness between towns where guilds did and did not have
some formal power, we find that locals made up 41 percent of new masters in
towns where guilds had power, compared to 39 percent where they did not; the
split if we look at kinship is 39 percent where guilds had power against 25 per-
cent where guilds did not. The difference in guild openness between the two
types of community is not statistically significant at conventional levels on ei-
ther measure.54 In fact, there is no consistency among towns that share a politi-
cal regime. The politically influential guilds of London were flooded with
migrant youths, while the guilds of Amsterdam, which were not officially in-
volved in politics, had far fewer. Guild political influence did not automatically
translate into closed apprenticeships or closed masterships, though it could of
course do so in particular contexts.
We also tried to map our results against the related phenomenon of guild
autonomy. David Stasavage claims that “autonomous” towns in the long run
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suffer from the tendency of their guilds to become increasingly closed and thus
stifle the local economy.55 Unfortunately, all our towns, apart from Amsterdam,
are in his nonautonomous group, and even the classification of Amsterdam
could be questioned. If Stasavage is correct, then this may explain why we find
most guilds to be relatively open. That said, we do see a lot of variation in open-
ness among these “non-autonomous” towns, suggesting that autonomy may offer
only a partial explanation for guilds’ behavior.
If local power and regional cultures and institutional differences cannot ex-
plain guild openness, is town size a good predictor? It is by no means perfect, but
figures 4a and 4b, which trace the relationship between our two openness meas-
ures for masters relative to urban population, suggest that it does a better job
than the other theories. There is a clear drift from closed to open as we move
from smaller to larger towns when we plot openness to masters against popula-
tion; and simple bivariate regressions of the share of local or kin masters against
the log of city population yield statistically significant negative coefficients.56
Not all guilds fit the pattern; we still find some relatively closed guilds in the
largest cities, but, otherwise, the match is good for this group. In a way, this
should not come as a surprise because large towns required large numbers of
immigrants to maintain their size or grow further.57 We have too few cities in
the apprentice sample to identify a meaningful relationship between openness
and population. However, the apprentice sample does point to a direct link be-
tween openness and the economic cycle: unsurprisingly, it was Europe’s fastest-
growing centers that attracted larger shares of outside youths among their
apprentices.
As a large number of Europe’s guilds were active in medium- and small-
sized towns, this result suggests that the pessimists have a strong argument: if the
association of openness and size holds, it is possible that the majority of guilds
were relatively closed to outsiders. However, because small town guilds had
small memberships, it is also possible that most masters were members of more
open guilds. In the Netherlands in 1795, almost 30 percent of the population
lived in cities of ten thousand and over and only 12 percent more in cities below
the ten thousand mark. In England and Wales (1801), the percentages were 20
and 11, respectively. Large centers with more open guilds thus reflect the experi-
ence of the most substantial part of the population in these two countries. In
Prussia (1801), only 8 percent lived in large towns but 14 percent in small
towns; in the German territories on the left bank of the Rhine (1806), the per-
centages were 7 and 10.58 This suggests that the “small town” numbers in table
4 better capture the German situation, whilst the “large town” numbers are
more representative for the Low Countries and England.
Do our results only apply for the two centuries for which we have been able
to uncover evidence? The waxing and waning of guilds has long been debated,
and one obvious objection to deriving any broad conclusion about the nature of
Europe’s guilds from their behavior in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
is that these periods came at the twilight of this economic institution. Perhaps
guilds in their medieval heyday were much more closed.
Historians’ ideas about when guilds were strongest have been complicated
in recent years by evidence that the number of guild foundations was increasing
into the early modern period in the Netherlands, France, and Italy.59 Even in
countries such as England—once the paradigmatic case of guild decline—some
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guilds remained active into the late eighteenth century.60 Still, guilds were, ar-
guably, losing power as time went on because the growth of markets and states
decreased the need and scope for such producers’ organizations. One might ex-
pect greater openness to be the result. Yet, if anything, our data suggest that
guilds were becoming somewhat less open over time (figure 1). Between the
early seventeenth and later eighteenth centuries, the share of guilds in which
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Figure 4. Guild openness related to town size in Europe
4a: Local master shares against city population (log scale)
4b: Kin master shares against city population
Note: Figure 4 reports the unweighted average share of guild openness as reported in
figures 1 and 2 (shares of locals) across all periods in our sample; each guild is thus
represented by a single observation. Source: see appendix 1.
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masters’ own children provided over a third of new masters rose from 18 percent
to 37 percent, while the share in which locals supplied over a third of new mas-
ters rose from 45 to 75 percent—although it is more accurate to talk of a fluctua-
tion here, thanks to the inclusion of a new pool of German guilds. At the same
time, as we discussed earlier, we see a declining openness in a number of guilds
for which we have long-run evidence. Notably, this is a strong pattern in most
London guilds, which were supposed to have become enfeebled in the period.
There is too little data from the fifteenth and sixteenth century to create a
clear comparison. What exists does not suggest a sharp break in practices be-
tween late medieval and early modern guilds. In the five quarter-centuries be-
tween 1375 and 1500, the percentage of masters’ sons registered by the Coopers’
guild in Bruges fluctuated between 11 and 31. The weighted average came to 22
percent, similar to later guilds.61 In the fifteenth century, like the seventeenth,
only a small number of apprentices in the London’s Tailors and Skinners’ guilds
were master’s sons, while 19 percent of a sample of apprentices from 1350–1409
were from London, almost exactly matching the share in 1600–1650.62 In
sixteenth-century Ghent, however, the percentages were much higher, espe-
cially when the guilds were in power.63 Marriage contracts from sixteenth-
century Aix-en-Provence suggest generally relatively open guilds: none of the
twenty-seven tailors entering marriage contracts was the son of a tailor. The
carders, tanners, and shoemakers were similar, though one of eighteen tanners
had followed his father. The weavers, on the other hand, tended to follow their
fathers’ occupation. Interestingly, occupational closure was reflected in their
marriages: weavers frequently married weavers’ daughters or women connected
to the weaving community. This happened rarely in the more open guilds. For
example, only three out of thirty-six shoemakers married a daughter or sister of
another shoemaker.64 These examples are comparable to those we observed for
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and do not suggest a clear trend to-
ward or away from greater openness.
Migration Benchmarks
Our discussion of guilds has concentrated on their relative position within a
range of peers. For a few places we can go somewhat further and compare the
openness of guilds to that of the town or city in general by considering the per-
centage of migrants in the total population. There are clearly endogeneity issues
here: if guilds dominated the local economy, they may have influenced migra-
tion into the town as a whole.
Evidence about towns in Holland is least likely to suffer from this problem:
most welcomed foreigners as a policy, especially during the seventeenth century,
and had substantial unincorporated sectors.65 On this basis, we could judge the
Rotterdam goldsmiths (77 percent local), the Delft painters (70 percent local),
or the Haarlem dyers (83 percent local) to be closed guilds, displaying substan-
tially higher percentages of locals than each city’s population (45, 40, and 52
percent respectively). The Amsterdam tailors, on the other hand, had fewer
locals in their ranks (23 percent) than we would expect on the basis of their 47
percent share of the town’s population. Other data about the Amsterdam popu-
lation in the seventeenth century, which includes masters as well as journey-
men, demonstrates huge variations in the share of locals versus immigrants. If
18 Winter 2020Journal of Social History
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we look only at incorporated trades, we find the bakers were dominated by
(German) immigrants, whereas the shipwrights were two-thirds locals.66
Similarly, in Madrid, where immigrants supplied between 53 and 70 percent of
the population between the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth century, two-
thirds of the city’s guilds’ memberships also came from outside the city.67
In England, female migration rates offer a similar benchmark for openness.
In early seventeenth-century London, 23 percent of women were locals com-
pared to an average of 28 percent of new masters in the city’s guilds; in the sec-
ond half of the century, the shares of locals in each group had risen to 31
percent and 37 percent, respectively.68 In short, masters appear more local than
the population as a whole. Note, however, that these are unweighted averages
based on multiple guilds. Larger guilds such as the Clothworkers (18 percent lo-
cal) were markedly more open than smaller ones such as the Apothecaries (26
percent) and Stationers (34 percent). If we weigh the average to account for the
size of different guilds, an average of 23 percent of masters were locals early on,
rising to 34 percent later, little different to the city’s women in each period.
Despite major variations among different guilds and among different cities,
this brief exercise suggests that the share of foreigners in most guilds was similar
to the overall share of foreigners in the towns where they were located.
Conclusions
How exclusive were guilds? Measured by the share of migrants among mas-
ters and apprentices, guilds varied greatly, but in most, the majority of new
members were from outside the town or city. Few guilds were completely domi-
nated by locals: only one in five guilds drew two-thirds or more of new masters
from their locality. Similarly, new masters drawn from the immediate families of
existing members were a small minority in most European guilds. In 40 percent
of guilds, fewer than one in five new members were the sons, or occasionally
daughters, of a guild member. Only one in seven of the guilds investigated here
recruited half or more of their new members from their own children. Given
that artisan parents could potentially transfer a workshop and equipment to
their children, it is especially striking that this was not the typical way to be-
come a master.
Our results suggest that blanket references to guild exclusiveness are mis-
leading in many cases. The breadth of the distribution that we see in our results
should serve as a caution against assuming that guilds shared universal character-
istics of any kind. That said, amid wide variations in levels of closure, the major-
ity were, if anything, tending towards relative openness. No doubt all kinds of
obstacles stood in the way of joining guilds, but often those obstacles proved sur-
mountable for large numbers of male “outsiders.” In many places, guild
“monopolies” were accessible to such a wide range of people that the word loses
its explanatory value. Much of their potential for rent creation would have been
dissipated over an expansive pool of new masters, as entry restrictions often
proved low enough that entrants without insider ties provided a large proportion
of the next generation. In such cases, in which a substantial percentage of mas-
ters was recruited from beyond the guild and its immediate community, talented
and determined outsiders could and did access these sectors of urban economies
Monopoly and Mobility in European Craft Guilds 19
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in large numbers. Aside from those guilds that imposed strict quotas, the burden
they imposed on consumers and producers should have been modest.
Of the four theses that have been used to explain guild exclusiveness, we
found support for only one. The size of towns was a reasonable predictor of guild
openness. Relatively open guilds were found in larger communities, whereas
small communities tended to have more closed guilds. The caveat is that both
of our smallest towns were located in Germany. Both commonplaces about re-
gional differences across Europe and between political regimes proved to be a
poor predictor of guild openness, and where indications were found of a decline
in openness, the trend was not very strong. A fuller explanation of variations in
guilds’ openness will therefore likely need to draw on other factors, such as the
organization of their trade, mercantile dominance, capital intensity, or specific
institutional shocks such as disease, fire, and war.
Why were Europe’s guilds generally more open than the stylized facts in the
literature indicated? Set against the potential economic rents that masters might
accrue from closure were a number of good reasons for guilds and urban authori-
ties in premodern societies to be wary of excluding outsiders. Amongst these,
two stand out in particular. One is that urban communities found it very diffi-
cult to reproduce themselves demographically. To maintain the size of the local
population and to fuel growth, an influx of immigrants was simply necessary.
There is an interesting parallel here with modern welfare states that are strug-
gling to support the needs of aging populations.69 The second is that all these
communities, but especially the larger ones, found it difficult to consistently po-
lice the boundaries of their communities. Exclusion also threatened to be coun-
terproductive. Exclusionary policies might stimulate “illicit” entrepreneurs to set
up business outside the control of the guild, for example in the suburbs or the
adjacent countryside.70 The authorities were equally ambivalent: they wanted
strong guilds to help them impose political and social control, but they also
feared the guilds as potential platforms for revolutionary activities.71
An instructive parallel is offered by immigration policies in the twentieth
century. Nation states have the capacity to use citizenship to bar prospective
migrants from entering their labor markets. The policies that states follow in
practice have varied significantly, but the net effect has been to provide very
substantial rents to the citizens of the developed world, if measured by unskilled
wage differentials.72 This was reflected in much of the debate surrounding the
introduction of restrictive immigration policies in the United States prior to
1917; attention was focused squarely on the potential effects of international
population inflows on the high wages received by American workers.73 This
offers a modern benchmark for the capacity of institutions to reward insiders.
Moreover, it suggests that modern labor market distortions have been far larger
than those that existed under the guild regime in the early modern world.
Endnotes
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Intellectual Property, eds. I. Alexander and H. T. Gomez-Arostegui (Cheltenham, UK,
2016), 81–95.
50. Statistical interpretations are difficult due to small sample sizes, but t-tests of the
equality of means of the local master shares between England, the Low Countries, and
Latin Europe (France, Italy, and Spain combined) show that only differences in the first
pair are close to statistical significance. The results of these tests are as follows: England
against the Low Countries: t ¼ -1.93, N¼16; England against Latin Europe: t ¼ 0.87,
N¼40.
T-tests of the equality of means of the kin master shares between England, the Low
Countries, and Latin Europe (France and Spain combined) show no significant differen-
ces between groups. The results of these tests are as follows: England against the Low
Countries: t ¼ 0.23, N¼17; England against Latin Europe: t ¼ 1.85, N¼40.
51. The values of the test statistics for equality of the share of local masters are as
follows: England against Germany, t ¼ 1.67, N¼68; England against the Low Countries,
t ¼ 1.31, N¼43; England against Latin Europe, t ¼0.21, N¼39.
52. The number of cities in the sample is small: England 8; France 2; Low Countries 4;
and Spain 2.
53. Towns where guilds had government power are: Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent,
Hildesheim, and London.
54. Locals: student’s t-test, N¼34, t ¼ 0.28; Kin, N¼30, t ¼ 1.45. This calculation is
based on each guild contributing a single average figure for local or kin across all periods
on our data.
55. Stasavage, “Was Weber Right?,” 353; we thank the author for making his data avail-
able to us.
56. A regression of kin master share against the log of population yields the following
coefficients (t-statistics in parentheses): local ¼ 101.5 (7.52)—6.54 * ln(population)
(5.53), N¼69, R-square ¼ 0.31. The result of a regression of local master share against
the log of population is: local ¼ 84.4 (6.38)—3.56 * ln(population) (3.08), N¼80, R-
square ¼ 0.11. Further details are available on request.
57. For England, see Jeffrey G. Williamson, Coping with City Growth during the British
Industrial Revolution (Cambridge, 1990), 26.
58. Jan de Vries, European Urbanization 1500–1800 (London, 1984), 59.
59. Bert De Munck, Piet Lourens and Jan Lucassen, “The Establishment and Distribution of
Craft Guilds in the Low Countries, 1000–1800,” in Prak et al., eds., Craft Guilds in the Early
Modern Low Countries, 37 (tab. 2.1); Luca Mocarelli, “Guilds Reappraised: Italy in the Early
Modern Period,” in Lucassen, De Moor and Van Zanden, eds., The Return of the Guilds, 164
fig. 1.
60. Berlin, “Guilds in Decline?”
61. Peter Stabel, “Social Mobility and Apprenticeship in late Medieval Flanders,” in
Learning on the Shop Floor: Historical Perspectives on Apprenticeship, ed. Bert De Munck,
Steven L. Kaplan, and Hugo Soly (Oxford, 2007), 170.
62. Stephanie Hovland, “Apprenticeship in Later Medieval London (c. 1300–c.1530)”
(PhD diss., University of London, 2006), 58; 62 n. 68.
63. Dambruyne, “Guilds,” 51.
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64. Claire Dolan, “The Artisans of Aix-en-Provence in the Sixteenth Century: A Micro-
analysis of Social Relationships,” in Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France, ed.
Philip Benedict (London, 1989), 181–85.
65. Jan Lucassen, “Holland, een open gewest: immigratie en bevolkingsontwikkeling,” in
Geschiedenis van Holland, vol. ii: 1572–1795, eds. Timo de Nijs and Eelco Beukers
(Hilversum, Netherlands, 2002), 207–10.
66. Erika Kuijpers, Migrantenstad: Immigratie en sociale verhoudingen in 17e-eeuws
Amsterdam (Hilversum, Netherlands, 2005), ch. 6 and p. 406.
67. Marıa F. Carbajo Isla, La poblacion de Madrid desde finales del siglo XVI hasta mediados
del XIX (Madrid, 1987), 118–25; we owe this reference to Jose Nieto.
68. Eleanor Hubbard, City Women: Money, Sex and the Social Order in Early Modern
London (Oxford, 2014), 20.
69. Peter Lindert, Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the
Eighteenth Century vol 1: The Story (Cambridge, 2004), 205–7.
70. Kaplan, “Les corporations.”
71. Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900–1300 (Oxford,
1997, 2nd. ed.), 68, 75; Soly, “Political Economy.”
72. Bob Hamilton and John Whalley, “Efficiency and Distributional Implications of
Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility: Calculations and Policy Implications,” Journal of
Development Economics 14, no. 1 (1984): 61–75, estimate that abolishing all restriction
on international labor migration would increase world GDP per capita in the 1980s by ap-
proximately 150 percent.
73. Francis A. Walker, “Restriction of Immigration,” Atlantic Monthly, June 1896, 822–29.
Data Appendix
The appendix lists for each town for which we have data:
 Name of guild
 Years of observation: where the dates cover more than one half century we
have counted them in both half centuries; when the data relate to less than
one half century but straddle two half centuries they have been allotted to the
half century with which there is the biggest overlap
 Local: percentage of masters/apprentices from the town itself
 Kin: percentage of masters/apprentices whose parents were members of the
same guild
Masters & Freemen
City Guild Period Local (%) Kin (%) N
England
Bristol*1 All 1650-99 42 7,639
1700-49 45 11,249
1750-99 49 9,902
Gloucester*2 All 1600-49 44 64
Continued
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. Continued
City Guild Period Local (%) Kin (%) N
1650-99 61 491
1700-49 78 726
Lincoln*3 All 1650-99 68 750
1700-49 67 813
1750-99 58 806
London4 Apothecaries 1617-49 26 3 177
1650-99 36 7 823
1700-49 41 9 237
Bowyers 1700-49 29 13 40
1750-99 33 15 20
Clockmakers 1650-99 23 19 1,983
1700-49 26 9 2,178
1750-99 73 15 2,006
Clothworkers 1600-49 18 9 2,085
1650-99 28 14 2,372
1700-49 50 21 1,743
1750-99 61 24 1,198
Goldsmiths 1600-49 27 13 1,057
1650-99 38 15 1,501
Mercers 1600-49 42 24 183
1650-99 52 25 387
1700-49 70 37 189
1750-99 57 37 8
Merchant Taylors 1600-49 20 10 4,998
1650-99 37 18 3,868
1700-49 54 24 1,673
1750-99 62 26 179
Stationers 1600-49 34 15 1,357
1650-99 45 19 889
1700-49 62 21 94
1750-99 68 17 398
France
Dijon5 All 1693-1730 23 1,822
1731-60 13 2,397
1761-90 9 3,661
Paris6 All 1766-75 26 13,426
Locksmiths 1735-50 20 186
1742-76 34 346
Seamstress 1735-76 8 5,509
Rouen7 All 1600-99 54 6,840
1700-99 59 8,488
German Europe
Berlin*8 Bakers 1709-50 27 489
Butchers 36 303
Construction 21 480
Coopers 30 89
Metal 34 689
Shoemakers 24 913
Textiles 15 2,499
Continued
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. Continued
City Guild Period Local (%) Kin (%) N
Gdansk/Danzig*9 Bakers 1640-1709 53 416
Butchers 47 181
Construction 38 203
Coopers 58 235
Textiles 45 2,257
Durlach10 Bakers 1700-99 55 131
Butchers 57 103
Carpenters 55 38
Coopers 50 114
Joiners 42 38
Linenweavers 51 57
Masons 31 49
Shoemakers 61 130
Tailors 44 105
Hildesheim11 Barbers 1700-49 13 16
1750-99 0 23
Basketmakers 1700-49 32 13
1750-99 67 12
Blacksmiths 1700-49 50 24
1750-99 48 23
Bookbinders 1750-99 50 18
Smiths (other) 1700-49 34 80
1750-99 49 80
Tailors 1700-49 6 68
1750-99 23 99
Tinsmiths 1700-49 38 13
1750-99 20 10
Wheelwrights 1700-49 53 15
1750-99 45 11
Vienna12 Bakers 1742 26 102
Bookbinders 56 18
Brewers 1 70
Butchers 47 32
Cabinetmakers 14 140
Coopers 22 67
Goldsmiths 48 116
Shoemakers 15 555
Sword-cutlers 70 36
Tailors 13 640
Weavers 10 31
Wildberg13 All trades 1666-1760 >90 >80 >500
Worsted weavers 1598-1647 60 247
1666-99 91 131
1700-60 91 228
Italy
Turin14 Tailors 1705 5 288
Low Countries
Amsterdam15 Tailors 1730-1769 17 1,345
1770-1798 23 1,129
Continued
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. Continued
City Guild Period Local (%) Kin (%) N
Antwerp16 Coopers 1671-1700 24 177
1701-50 30 204
1751-93 35 89
Shoemakers 1766-90 17 127
Tailors 1714-79 22 813
Brussels17 Tailors 1694-1786 22 828
Delft18 Painters 1613 38 32
1613-49 70 92
1650-1679 75 40
Ghent19 Woodworkers 1616-30 23 137
1631-67 0 206
Haarlem20 Dyers 1663 83 36
1714 65 60
Rotterdam21 Goldsmiths 1665 77 34
’s-Hertogenbosch22 Butchers 1749-75 100 120
Coopers 9 65
Goldsmiths 12 17
Spain
Barcelona23 Bookbinders 1794-1835 33 95
Madrid**24 Various 1643-49 32 569
1700-49 25 9 2,187
1750-99 29 16 3,233
Valencia25 Silk 1756-1805 91 44 2077
*refers to the use of citizenship registers; in other cases we rely on guild sources.
**recalculated without the “unknowns.”
Apprentices
City Guild Period Local (%) Kin (%) N
England
Boston26 all 1650-99 15 259
1700-49 64 411
1750-99 29 1,069
Bristol27 all 1650-99 45 17 2,227
1700-49 53 10 5,290
1750-99 62 6 10,157
Gloucester28 all 1600-49 36 11 1,789
1650-99 47 15 2,266
1700-49 55 18 1,576
Leicester29 all 1600-49 42 22 131
1650-99 39 9 43
1700-49 41 7 199
1750-99 44 23 197
Lincoln30 all 1650-99 40 23 603
1700-49 29 8 823
1750-99 36 8 748
Continued
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. Continued
City Guild Period Local (%) Kin (%) N
Liverpool31 all 1700-49 12 2 701
London32 Various 1600-49 18 2 101,914
1650-99 32 4 145,180
1700-49 51 8 106,307
1750-99 62 1 59,545
Shrewsbury33 all 1650-99 39 28 331
France
Lyon34 silk 1710-39 29
1740-69 32
1770-90 29
various 1746-47 26 405
Paris35 all 1761 72 815
Low Countries
Amsterdam36 surgeons 1597-1659 67 1,057
Antwerp 37 cabinetmakers 1691-1760 3 412
carpenters 1701-90 8 975
coopers 1671-1700 34 635
1701-1750 30 479
1751-1793 17 186
silversmiths 1600-50 75 32
1650-1700 78 123
1700-50 83 58
1750-1800 90 31
tinsmiths 1711-50 25 150
1751-90 19 105
Haarlem38 coopers 1649-68 3 61
shoemakers 1736-97 91 6 790
Leiden39 surgeons 1683-1729 70 15 391
Spain
Barcelona40 fanmakers 1762-92 26 13 146
builders 1786-1820 35 56
silk-reeling 1760-1762 48 29
veil weaving 1825-1849 50 1,482
booksellers 1760-1788 26 15 39
Madrid41 various 1607-99 7 215
1700-49 28 131
1750-99 47 289
Data Appendix Endnotes
1. Bristol & Avon Family History Society, Bristol Burgess Books, 1557-1995, Index &
Transcripts (Bristol, 2004).
2. A.F.J. Jurica and P. Ripley, eds., A Calendar of the Registers of the Freemen of the City of
Gloucester, 1641-1838, Gloucestershire Record Series, 4 (Gloucester, 1991).
3. Lincolnshire Family History Society, “Lincoln City Apprentices & Freemen” (unpub-
lished typescript).
4. Apothecaries: Guildhall Library, “Society of Apothecaries,” Freedom Register, MS
8206/1; Bowyers, Clothmakers, Goldsmiths, Mercers: Centre for Metropolitan History,
Records of London Livery Companies Online. URL http://www.londonroll.org/. We used
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